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                                             1    Introduction  
 
Markowitz (1952) in a seminal paper proposed a model of non-expected 
utility that could explain wagering at actuarially unfair odds. He assumed 
that from a reference point, such as an agent’s customary or normal level of 
wealth, agents are initially risk-loving then risk-averse over gains whilst 
initially risk-adverse then risk-seeking over losses. The value functions over 
gains and losses were assumed to be bounded from above and below to 
avoid the St. Petersburg paradox (Markowitz (1952) p154). Markowitz also 
assumed that the representative agent is loss-averse1 and does not exhibit 
probability distortion. Conlisk (1993) stated that the Markowitz model of 
utility had been relatively ignored by economists and that is arguably still 
the case even though the paper now has 1444 citations on Google Scholar. 
Like Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) of Kahneman and Tversky2 
(1979), widely regarded as the major alternative to expected utility theory, 
the Markowitz model implies the fourfold attitude to risky choice exhibited 
in numerous experimental studies. The fourfold attitude towards risk implies 
that when payoffs are large, individuals are risk averse in gains and risk 
seeking in losses and when the payoffs are small individuals are risk seeking 
in gains and risk averse in losses. See e.g. Scholten and Read (2014) for 
recent evidence. 
One motivation of Markowitz for his new model of utility was to remove the 
property of the Friedman and Savage (1948) model of expected utility that 
individuals when in the risk seeking segment of their utility function derive 
positive expected utility from potentially ruinous bets by wagering all of 
their wealth at actuarially unfair odds.  This implication runs counter to 
common observation.  
Our purpose in this note is to demonstrate that Markowitz’s original 
specification of non-expected utility also embodies the ruinous wagering 
property. We show that in order to remove this property it is necessary to 
make the additional assumption that the degree of loss aversion approaches 
infinity as stake size as a proportion of wealth approaches unity.  
                                                 
1
 Markowitz wrote, ‘Generally people avoid symmetric bets. This suggests that the curve 
falls faster to the left of the origin than it rises to the right. We may assume that 
U X U X X( ) ( ),− > > 0 where X = 0 is customary wealth’ (Markowitz, 1952, pp. 154-155). 
This definition of loss aversion was also employed by Kahmenan and Tversky (1979) in 
their model of Cumulative Prospect Theory. 
2
 Cumulative Prospect Theory of Kahnerman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and 
Kahnerman (1992) embody the reference point hypothesis of Markowitz and the 
assumption of loss aversion. However it is assumed that subjects are solely risk-averse 
over gains and solely risk-loving over loses. To explain gambling on actuarially unfair 
outcomes it is assumed in CPT that agents subjectively distort the probabilities of events, 
via an inverted s-shaped probability weighting function, so that low probabilities are 
over-estimated by the representative agent and high probabilities are under estimated. 
 
 2 
The remainder of the note is structured as follows. In section 2 we set out a 
parametric formulation of the Markowitz model and illustrate the ruinous 
gambling feature. We then present a parametric version of a Markowitz 
model that eliminates the ruinous wagering property. Section 3 is a brief 
conclusion. 
 
                           Section 2 Ruinous Wagers and Loss Aversion 
 
Expected utility or value, EV, for a one outcome wager is given in the 
Markowitz model by  
EV pU G p kU Lg l= − −( ) ( ) ( )1                                                                        (1)                                                                           
Where p is the probability of gain, G is the gain and L is the loss. U Gg ( )  Is 
the value function over gains, U Ll ( ) the value function over losses and k is a 
positive constant. 
The assumption of Markowitz that the value functions are bounded from 
above and below is captured by imposing the restrictions on the value 
functions that when gains and losses are infinite Ug ( )∞ = 1, Ul ( )∞ = 1  and  
Ug ( )0 0=  and Ul ( ) .0 0=   This implies the value of gains lay between zero 
and unity and value of losses between zero and minus k. In the context of 
wagering on a one outcome gamble or lottery the gain, G, is equal to so and  
Loss, L, is equal to s, where s is stake size and o=odds. 
To illustrate the ruinous property assume for simplicity that stake size is 
infinite.  
From equation (1) this implies that  
 EV p p k= − −( )1                                                                                        (2)                                                                                
This further implies that expected value, EV, is positive when  
p k
k
> +1                                                                                                     (3)                                                                                                                      
The condition (3) implies the Markowitz agent would accept an actuarially 
unfair wager of any magnitude if the probability of winning, p, 
exceeds k
k1+ . 
The degree of loss aversion, LA, is defined by Markowitz (1952) and 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) as the ratio of the absolute value of loss of 
expected value to the gain in expected value from a symmetric gamble. In 
the context of wagering   this implies that loss aversion for stake size, s, is 







( )                                                                                              (4)                                                                                                
For infinitely large stakes with symmetric gains and losses the boundedness 
assumptions for the value functions imply from (4) that loss aversion, A, 
will be equal to k. Consequently it follows from (3) that unless k  
 3 
approaches infinity as stake size approaches infinity agents will obtain 
positive expected value  from wagers with high probability of win regardless 
of how  actuarially unfair3. 
Of course individuals do not wager infinite amounts so we now consider 
how practically relevant this point is employing a parametric model of the 
Markowitz model. 
As noted by Abdellaoui et al (2007) a parametric form of the Markowitz 
model can be obtained based on the expo-power function of Saha (1993). 
For this value function expected utility or value, EV, for a wager with one 
payoff is given by  
EV p p ke er so sn n= − − −− −−( ) ( )( ) ( )1 11λ λ                                    (5)                                              
 
Where r,λ and n are positive constants. When the exponent of the value 
functions n is greater than unity we obtain the form of value functions 
hypothesized by Markowitz. The agent is initially risk-loving then risk-
averse over gains, as ( )n
r n
− 1
λ  is either greater or less than ( )so
n
 and initially 
risk-averse then risk-loving over losses, as ( )n
n
− 1
λ is greater or less than s
n
. 
 Employing the expo-power value functions in (5) the degree of loss 
aversion as defined by Markowitz, LA, for  symmetric gains and losses of 














λ  > 1                                                                    (6)                                                                        
   
From (6), employing L’Hopital’s Rule, we find that as stake size approaches 
zero the degree of loss aversion, LA, is given by the lower limit of k
r
 and  
as stake size approaches infinity by  the upper limit of k . Consequently for 
the expo-power value functions with the parameter k assumed constant loss 
aversion lies between the upper and lower limits of  
 k k
r
> > 1                                                                                                    (7)                                                                                
In order to ensure that the marginal value of a loss always exceeds the 
marginal value of a gain, for symmetric gains and losses of size s, we 
differentiate (6) with respect to stake size and deduce that the constant r 
must be greater than unity.4 
                                                 
3
 Peel and Law (2008) noted this property but did not provide a solution. 
4
 It is important to note that qualitatively the same  properties of  the expo-power value 
specifications of the  Markowitz value functions  are also obtained in the only  two other 
 4 
We can determine the stake that maximizes expected value for the expo-
power value functions by differentiating (6) with respect to stake size. (See 




















































λ                                              (8)                                             
The second order condition 
 ro   ensures a local maximum.n − >1 0  
The expected return to a one unit stake is defined by µ = − −po p( )1  .  
We note  that since n>1, the assumption in the Markowitz model, for a given 
negative expected return, µ,  and fixed degree of loss aversion over tiny 
stakes, k
r
, the numerator in (8) will always become positive for large 
enough odds, o.  Consequently the Markowitz agent will always obtain 
positive expected value by wagering on actuarially unfair outcomes that 
have large enough odds. 
However as we will illustrate below the stake in (8) will not be a global 
maximum if the agent’s wealth is sufficiently large. 
 Consider a Markowitz agent with the expo-power value functions defined 
by (5) with parameter values n= 1.25, r= 2, k= 4.5 andλ = 0 00001. . Loss 
aversion for small stakes, k
r
, with these parameter values is approximately 
2.25 the degree of loss aversion assumed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
This agent would obtain positive expected value of approximately 
Eu = 0 06
10000
.
 by wagering $8 on one number at US roulette with o=35, 
p=1/38 and negative expected return to a unit stake of -0.0526. This is 
illustrated in Figure1. 
                                                                                                                                                 
specifications  of the Markowitz value functions we are aware of. For example the double 
exponential form  specification of the Markowitz value functions, (see Cain et al (2003), 
where we employ the same constants, though with usually different values, for ease of 
interpretation, is given by  
EV p r so p ke e e er so r so s ss= − − − − −− − − −−( ) ( )( )1 11λ λ λ λλ λ  
 These value functions   have   a lower limit for loss version of   k
r2
, and an upper limit of 
k with  k k
r

















EV is multiplied by 10000.  
 
 However the same agent could obtain maximum expected value, which is 
up to approximately 34,000 times greater than the expected value of the one 
number wager, by wagering all their wealth on 35 numbers simultaneously 
at US roulette if their wealth exceeded $113105. For this wager on US 
roulette p=35/38, o=1/35 and expected return to a unit wager is -0.0526. The 
expected value of this wager is illustrated in Figure2. 
 
Figure 2 Expected Value for a Wager (s) on Thirty Five Numbers 













EV is multiplied by 10000 
 
It is important to note that the parameter values assumed for the value 
functions in this example are not special. In fact any parameter values that 
imply that wagers on low probability long shots have positive expected value, 
a key prediction of the Markowitz model, will also imply potentially ruinous 
wagers on high probability outcomes because of property (3).  
We assume that individuals with large wealth levels would not obtain expected 
value from engaging in potentially ruinous optimal wagering. Consequently it 
is an unreasonable prediction of the Markowitz model5. To remove the ruinous 
                                                 
5
 Another example with the parameters n=2, r=2, k=4.5 and λ = 0 0002.  an individual 
would maximize expected utility or value by wagering all their wealth when p=0.85 
 6 
wagering property it appears necessary to assume that the parameter k, that 
determines the higher limit for loss aversion, is dependent on stake size as a 
proportion of wealth becoming infinite when stake size is equal to total 
wealth6.  It would be nice if we could modify the specification of the value 
function over losses, U Ll ( ) , and embody the assumption that loss aversion 
becomes infinite as loss approaches infinity. However it appears that no 
modifications of the value function over losses exist which preserve the 
properties that individuals are initially risk-averse and then risk-seeking over 
losses and also that loss aversion is always increasing in loss size. 
One example of a function for k which captures the desired loss aversion 









                                                                                           (9)                                              
Where k  0 and   β are constants with  k   < 00 and> 0 β  and  
s
w
 is stake size as 
a proportion of wealth. 
For example with  k  = 4.5 and = -5 0 β  we obtain values of  
 k = 4.73,  7.45,20.65 and 1022.6  when  s
w
=0.01, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.9 respectively. 
Larger values of the parameter  




 increases.7  Since the function (9) can exhibit a low degree of loss 
aversion when stake size is a small proportion of wealth individuals will still 
wager at actuarially unfair odds but no longer obtain positive expected utility 
from engaging in potentially ruinous wagers.  
 To illustrate with parameter  values of n= 1.25,  r= 2, λ = 0 00001. ,  the same 
parameter values as employed in first example, and with k  = 4.5,  = -5 0 β  and 
initial wealth of $200000 an individual would optimally   stake approximately 
$8  on one number on US roulette as in the example above. However the 
                                                                                                                                                 
o=0.00005 and expected return to a unit bet of -0.15, but only when stake size is greater 
than $397849.   
6
 Assuming loss aversion depends on stake size as a proportion of wealth appears in the 
spirit of the Markowitz model. Unlike in CPT Markowitz assumed an agent’s wealth 
level would impact on the curvature of the value functions. In particular Markowitz   
assumed the distance between the first and third inflexion points of the value functions 
was not independent of the agent’s wealth level which he assumed were closer to the 
reference point for a less wealthy individual. (Markowitz p154-155.) 
7
 For example with 




individual will now obtain negative expected value from wagering all their 





One motivation for Markowitz’s specification of a non expected utility model 
was to remove the counterfactual property of the Friedman and Savage model 
of expected utility that individuals, when in the risk seeking segment of the 
utility function, could obtain maximum expected utility by wagering   all their 
wealth on actuarially unfair gambles.  We showed that the Markowitz model 
also embodied this property. To remove this property we showed that it is 
necessary to assume that loss aversion tends to infinity as stake size as a 
proportion of wealth tends to unity.  
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